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Abstract
A closer look at some proposed Gedanken-experiments on BECs promises
to shed light on several aspects of reduction and emergence in physics. These
include the relations between classical descriptions and di¤erent quantum treat-
ments of macroscopic systems, and the emergence of new properties and even
new objects as a result of spontaneous symmetry breaking.
1 Introduction
Not long after the rst experimental production of a Bose-Einstein condensate
(BEC) in a dilute gas of rubidium in 1995(1), experiments demonstrated interfer-
ence between two such condensates(2). Interference is a wave phenomenon, and
here it was naturally taken to involve a well-dened phase di¤erence between
two coherent matter waves the BECs themselves. Experimental phenomena
associated with well-dened phase-di¤erences were already familiar from other
condensed matter systems. The alternating current observed across a Joseph-
son junction between two similar superconductors was (and is) explained by
appeal to their varying phase-di¤erence induced by a constant voltage di¤erence
across the junction. These two phenomena are now considered manifestations of
quantum behavior at the macroscopic or at least mesoscopic level since they
involve very large numbers of atomic or sub-atomic systems acting in concert,
and it is the theory of quantum mechanics that has enabled us to understand
and (at least in the second instance) to predict them, both qualitatively and in
quantitative detail. They are among a variety of phenomena manifested by con-
densed matter that have been described as emergent(3);(4), in part as a way of
contrasting them with phenomena amenable to a reductive explanation in terms
of dynamical laws governing the behavior of their microscopic constituents.
While some kind of contrast with reduction is almost always intended by
use of the term emergent(or its cognates), the term has been widely applied
to items of many categories on diverse grounds. After briey commenting in
section 2 on philosophers attempts to regiment usage, I focus on a cluster
of issues surrounding the emergence of a denite phase in BECs and related
systems.
It is widely (though not universally) believed that the concept of broken
symmetry is key to understanding not only the Josephson e¤ect and interference
of BECs but also many other phenomena involving condensed matter.
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When the state of a condensate is represented by a mathematical object
with U(1) symmetry, spontaneous breaking of this symmetry is associated with
a denite phase the complex argument of an order parameter such as the
expectation-value of a eld operator. It may be said that this phase emerges
as a result of such spontaneous symmetry breaking. Analogies are often drawn
between this spontaneously broken phase symmetry and the breaking of rota-
tional symmetry as the magnetization of a Heisenberg ferromagnet or the axis
of a crystal acquires a denite orientation. But the attribution of a denite
value for the phase of a condensate raises a thicket of problems that challenge
these analogies.
While the orientation of a crystal or a Heisenberg ferromagnet has direct
operational signicance, it is at most the relative phase of two or more con-
densates that is manifested in interference experiments: the absolute phase of
a condensate is generally taken to be without physical signicance. A second
issue concerns measurements of the relative phase of condensates. In quantum
mechanics, a measurable magnitude (an observable) is represented by a self-
adjoint operator, and the possible results of a measurement of this observable
are given by the spectrum of this operator. But there are powerful reasons
for denying that observables generally have values for measurement to reveal.
If the relative phase were represented by such an operator, then the appear-
ance of a denite (relative) phase on measurement is no indication of a denite
pre-existing phase in the condensate. Rather than emerging spontaneously, the
denite phase would be precipitated by the measurement itself.
A number of recent papers have treated the emergence of a denite relative
phase between BECs as a stochastic physical process that occurs as a result of
multiple measurements of quantum observables, each on a di¤erent microscopic
constituent of the BECs(5) (11). The measured observable is not the phase it-
self, so there is no need to represent this by an operator. Indeed, as section 4
explains, the emerging relative phase plays the role of a kind of hidden vari-
ablewithin a standard quantum mechanical analysis. This analysis involves no
appeal to spontaneous symmetry-breaking. While some have embellished the
analysis by explicit appeal to von Neumanns controversial projection postu-
late (collapseof the wave-function on measurement), this proves unnecessary:
all that is required is standard Schrödinger quantum mechanics, including the
Born rule for joint probabilities. One way to look at this quantum mechani-
cal analysis is as a reduction of the theoretical treatment of relative phase in
terms of spontaneous symmetry-breaking. But this would not o¤er a reductive
replacement for relative phase but instead eliminate it entirely, by denying that
there is a well-dened relative phase prior to the measurements that prompt its
emergence.
A striking feature of the quantum mechanical analysis is that macroscopic
values for observables also emerge in the stochastic process that produces a well-
dened relative phase. These include transverse spin polarization in a region
occupied by two BECs, each composed of particles with aligned spins, where the
two alignments are in opposite directions. The measurements that induce this
macroscopic spin polarization are themselves microscopic, and may occur in a
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distant region. As section 5 explains, this nonlocalemergence of macroscopic
values violates expectations based on a common understanding of the Copen-
hagen interpretation, and has been presented as a strengthening of EPRs chal-
lenge to that interpretation(12). Section 6 considers a possible Bohrian response
to this challenge and explains why this is in tension with the common view
that the classical features of macroscopic objects may be derived from quantum
theory. This may prompt one to question the reduction of classical to quantum
physics.
For a global U(1) symmetry, Noethers rst theorem implies the existence of
a conserved quantity, which may in this case be identied with the number of
bosons present in a condensate. Broken global U(1) symmetry then apparently
implies a condensate composed of an indeterminate number of bosons. While
coherent laser light has long been accepted as an example of a condensate with
an indeterminate number of massless bosons, an indeterminate number of atoms
in a BEC/Cooper pairs in a superconductor threatens cherished beliefs about
conservation of mass, and baryon/lepton number. Section 7 addresses the ques-
tion: Do we have here an emergent object an object not composed of any
denite number of its constituents?
The present paper attempts no more than a preliminary survey of a clus-
ter of complex interrelated issues concerning reduction and emergence in Bose-
Einstein condensates, each of which will repay detailed further study.
2 Emergence and Reduction
In physics and elsewhere, reduction and emergence are characteristically taken
to label opposing views of a single relation, but lack of clarity about the nature
of the relation and the identities of the relata often results in debates between
reductionists and their opponents that generate more heat than light. One
problem is that while it is typically phenomena, behavior, properties, objects,
etc. that are said (or denied) to be emergent, reduction is more commonly
thought of as a relation between theories, theoretical descriptions, sciences or
laws (strictly, law statements). So while emergence is a relation that may or
may not hold between items in the world that scientists study, reduction is a
relation applicable only to products of that study. This division is not hard and
fast1 . But it is a division I shall respect in my usage in this paper.
In their attempts to clarify the notion of emergence, philosophers have typ-
ically begun by concentrating their e¤orts on the emergence of properties. No
consensus has been reached, and a number of alternative analyses have been
proposed(14) (17). Rather than take these as rival attempts to state neces-
sary and su¢ cient conditions for the correct application of the term emergent
1 In his qualied defense of reductionism, Weinberg(13) casts reduction and even reductive
explanation in ontological rather then epistemological or methodological terms. He freely
admits that a scientists best strategy in understanding a phenomenon is often not to look to
the fundamental laws that govern the elementary constituents of the systems involved, even
while maintaining that it is those laws that ultimately explain it.
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property, one should view them as alternative explications of the same rough
idea that an emergent property is one that is somehow autonomous from more
elementary underlying structures out of which it arises. Each may prove useful
in marking some contrast that is important in a di¤erent application. One com-
mon application of the notion of emergence is to the mind: philosophers and
cognitive scientists have debated the emergence of consciousness and other men-
tal properties from underlying physical processes involving the brain. But here
I am interested in contrasting specic physical properties (or, in one case, ob-
jects) with others as to their autonomy from or dependence on more elementary
physical structures.
The phase of a condensate is the rst such property, and the underlying
structures are the properties and arrangement of its constituent particles. The
phase of a condensate is actually a real-valued magnitude, though any qualita-
tive (i.e. non-numerical) property may be so regarded its values may be taken
to be 1 (for possessed) and 0 (for not possessed). Other magnitudes of systems
of condensates may also be considered emergent, including spin polarization,
magnetization and electric current. We shall see that not one but several senses
of emergence turn out to be usefully applied to these properties.
Broken symmetries associated with phase transitions in condensates have
been taken to give rise to emergent phenomena by both physicists and philosophers(3);(4);(16);(18)2 .
Weinberg(19) even denes a superconductor as simply a material in which elec-
tromagnetic gauge invariance is spontaneously broken. This at least suggests
that it is spontaneously broken symmetry that marks properties of matter as
emergent in a novel phase. The suggestion prompts formulation of a rst sense
of emergencerelevant to the phase of condensates: any property a system has
only by virtue of the spontaneously broken symmetry of its state may be said to
be emergent in this sense emergentssb . Spontaneous symmetry breaking ap-
pears novel to the extent that it violates an expectation that the ground state of
a quantum system with symmetric dynamics will itself possess that symmetry
an expectation whose failure always to be met in quantum eld theory has itself
sometimes been perceived as a novelty. If this is taken as a necessary as well as
su¢ cient condition for emergence, then properties of matter in some phase that
can be accounted for without appealing to broken symmetry would not count
as emergent.
In a second sense, emergence is a diachronic process rather than a synchronic
condition. Phase transitions occur as dynamical processes, whether or not the
symmetry of the prior state is physically broken during this process. So a phase
of matter with striking properties may emerge dynamically even though these
properties are not su¢ ciently autonomous from the underlying structure in the
new phase to count as (synchronically) emergent. If the properties of the new
phase appear su¢ ciently novel, their surprising emergence during this dynam-
ical process may be considered a su¢ cient condition for calling the properties
2Though Anderson(18) doesnt use the word emergent. It is an unfortunate linguistic
accident that in the expression phase transitionthe word phaserefers to states of matter
themselves (e.g. superconducting), not to the complex argument of a parameter that may be
used to characterize their degree of order.
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themselves emergentdyn .
I think there is another possible use of emergent, as applied to proper-
ties of a complex system which is, perhaps, illustrated by the emergence of a
denite (relative) phase in BECs. Consider such sensory predicates as red,
malodorous, bitter, silky or even wet or hard3 . In paradigm cases, though cer-
tainly not always, these are applied to a macroscopic object on the basis of the
response it elicits in a human who interacts with that object in a minimally
invasive way unfortunately, looking at a red tra¢ c light is not an e¤ective way
to turn it green, and nor does sni¢ ng rotten meat improve its smell. But do
such predicates pick out a corresponding property of that object?
Many and varied answers to that question have been proposed throughout
the history of philosophy and natural science. Some have defended a positive
answer by claiming that a property such as the redness of an object supervenes
on more fundamental properties of the microscopic constituents of that object
that are not themselves red. Others have denied the existence of any property
of redness, ushed with the prospect of a complete scientic explanation of our
ability to perceive, classify and reliably communicate about those things we call
red based only on their fundamental microphysical properties and ours. Philo-
sophical accounts of emergence generally presuppose that emergent properties
are real, even if they supervene on an underlying microphysical basis. But if
one had a complete scientic explanation of our ability to perceive, classify and
reliably communicate about those things we call red, that might itself be o¤ered
as an account of the emergence of redness even if there is no such property! For
the account would explain the success of our common practice of calling things
red and so license the continuance of that practice. Here we have a third sense
of emergence: emergencequasi , applicable to any situation where a predicate is
shown to designate no corresponding property or relation, since features of ob-
jects formerly accounted for by reference to that property or relation are now
wholly explained with no such reference. The next two sections will present
reasons for supposing the relative phase between BECs is emergent only in this
third sense.
3 BEC Phase as Emerging from Spontaneous
Symmetry Breaking?
In his seminal essay Anderson(18) takes the general theory of broken symmetry
to o¤er an illuminating formulation of how the shift from quantitative to qual-
itative di¤erentiation characteristic of emergence takes place4 . In agreement
with Weinberg(19) he mentions superconductivity as a spectacular example of
broken symmetry, though he gives several others.
The essential idea is that in the so-called N ! 1 limit of large
3See Wilsons(20) extended exploration of the sensory concomitants of the rst and last of
these terms and their bearing on the character of any corresponding property.
4at each level of complexity entirely new properties appear ((18), p.393).
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systems (on our own, macroscopic scale) it is not only convenient but
essential to realize that matter will undergo sharp, singular phase
transitionsto states in which the microscopic symmetries, and even
the microscopic equations of motion, are in a sense violated. (op.
cit. p.395)
After the 1995 experimental production of BECs in dilute gases, Laughlin
and Pines(3) were able to add the newly discovered atomic condensates as
examples that display emergent physical phenomena regulated by higher or-
ganizing principles. Since they cite Andersons paper approvingly and take a
principle of continuous symmetry breaking to explain (the exact character of)
the Josephson e¤ect, it is reasonable to conjecture that they would join Ander-
son in taking the phase transition from a normal dilute gas to a BEC as well
as that from a normal metal to a superconducting state to involve spontaneous
symmetry breaking.
What symmetry is taken to be broken in the transition to the condensed
phase of a BEC? The transition is from a less to a more ordered state, whose or-
der may be represented by a so-called order parameter. According to Leggett(21)
(p. 38) the order parameter characterizing a BEC (especially in the case of dilute
gases including rubidium) is often taken to be a complex-valued function the
expectation value of a Bose eld operator in the given quantum state.
	(r;t) =
D
 ^ (r;t)
E
(1)
If this is written as
	(r;t) = j	(r;t)j ei'(r;t) (2)
then the phase ' (r;t) parametrizes an element of the group U(1), corrresponding
to a transformation that sets the complex argument of 	 to ' at point (r;t). If
the equations describing the eld of the condensate are symmetric under global
U(1) transformations, then changing the order parameter by addition of an
arbitrary constant to the phase will take one solution into a distinct solution.
Global U(1) symmetry will be broken by choice of one such value.
An analogy is often drawn to the broken rotation symmetry of the Heisen-
berg ferromagnet as the spins of all its magnetic dipoles align along some ar-
bitrary direction in the ground state. That ts Andersons quoted description
well, since the phase transition to one such highly ordered ground state of the
ferromagnet is a good example of the kind of spontaneously broken symmetry
amenable to idealized treatment as a quantum system with an innite number
of degrees of freedom5 . In contrast to the case of a quantum system with a nite
number of degrees of freedom, degenerate ground states of such a system cannot
generally be superposed to give another state since they appear in distinct, uni-
tarily inequivalent, representations of the fundamental commutation relations.
Spontaneous breaking of the rotational symmetry of the Heisenberg ferromagnet
corresponds to the adoption of one out of the many states in which the dipoles of
5See, for example, Ruetsche(22).
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the ferromagnet are all aligned. In two or more dimensions, this means breaking
of a continuous rotational symmetry. By Goldstones theorem(23), when such a
continuous symmetry is broken in quantum mechanics the Hamiltonian has no
energy gap6 : in a quantum eld theory this implies the existence of massless
Goldstone bosons.
Pursuing this analogy, spontaneous breaking of the continuous U(1) phase
symmetry of a BECs order parameter could be represented by an idealized
model in which the number of constituent particles is taken to be innite, but
the density of the BEC is xed at some low value  by taking the so-called
thermodynamic limit N !1; V !1; N=V =  (a constant). Then adoption
of a denite phase by a BEC would be an instance of the same kind of sponta-
neous symmetry breaking as adoption of a denite direction of magnetization
by a Heisenberg ferromagnet. But there are problems with this analogy, as
Leggett(21);(25);(26) has noted.
When rotation symmetry of a Heisenberg ferromagnet is spontaneously bro-
ken, the spins of its components are all aligned along a particular direction in
space. This direction may be operationally dened in many ways having noth-
ing to do with spin or magnetization: in particular, it need not be dened in
relation to other Heisenberg ferromagnets, either actual or hypothetical. On
the other hand, if the U(1) global phase symmetry of a BEC were to be spon-
taneously broken, its overall phase would become well dened only relative to
some other BEC of the same kind (for example, a similarly condensed dilute gas
of rubidium 87). At most, a denite phase consequent upon spontaneously bro-
ken symmetry would seem to be an emergent relational property (cf. Teller(27))
of a BEC. Moreover, di¢ culties in implementing multiple pairwise phase com-
parisons between similar BECs that have never been in contact threaten at least
the operational signicance even of such a relational property. Leggett(26) ar-
gues that, at least in the case of superconducting BECs, operational pairwise
phase comparisons among several such BECs will fail to be transitive (though
compare Leggett(28)).
A second problem arises from the need to take the thermodynamic limit to
treat the emergence of relative phase in BECs as an instance of spontaneous
symmetry breaking. No massive BEC system is composed of an innite number
of elementary bosons. Moreover, while the number of elementary dipoles in a
macroscopic magnet will typically at least be extremely large (of the order of
1023 ), the rst dilute gas BECs contained only a few thousand atoms, and even
now experimental realizations have increased this number by only a few factors
of 10. If it were essential to assume that an innite number of atoms is present in
each of two interfering BECs to explain their observed interference (as the quote
from Anderson might lead one to believe), then one may legitimately query the
value of the explanation. But in fact one need not treat the emergence of relative
phase here as a case of spontaneous symmetry breaking in the thermodynamic
6As Streater(24) proved for the Heisenberg ferromagnet: this gives rise to the possibility
of spin waves of arbitarily small energy. Goldstones theorem actually depends on additional
hypotheses, not all of which need hold in the presence of long-range forces like those in a
(charged) superconductor.
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limit, as analyses by Castin and Dalibard(6) and several subsequent authors
have shown.
In the context of an idealized model of two trapped condensates of the same
atomic species, Castin and Dalibard(6) showed two things:
(1) No measurements performed on the condensates can allow one to
distinguish between two di¤erent quantum representations of this system: By a
statistical mixture of coherent states that uniformly averages over the unknown
relative phase between the condensates; and by a Poissonian statistical mixture
of Fock states, each with the same total number of particles.
(2) Two di¤erent points of view on a system are available: Assuming
an initial coherent state with well-dened relative phase between two conden-
sates, successive measurements reveal this pre-existing relative phase in an
interference phenomenon; assuming each condensate is initially represented by
a denite Fock state with no well-dened phase, the same sequence of measure-
ments progressively builds upa relative phase between the condensates as the
interference phenomenon is generated.
They take the results of their analysis to show that the notion of sponta-
neously broken phase symmetry is not indispensable in understanding inter-
ference between two condensates. I wont explain how they arrived at these
conclusions, since the next section outlines a closely related analysis by Laloë
of a similar Gedankenexperiment that will provide a focus for the subsequent
discussion. I will merely comment that Castin and Dalibard(6) assume that
the measurements referred to in (2) are performed in a well-dened temporal
sequence on individual elements of the system of condensates, and that each
leaves the rest of the system in the quantum state it would be assigned if the
e¤ect of that measurement were represented by von Neumanns projection pos-
tulate.
Before proceeding to Laloës analysis, it is appropriate to stress with Leggett(26)
that whether or not spontaneous symmetry breaking occurs in given circum-
stances is a physical question whose answer depends on details of those circum-
stances, and in particular on whether its occurrence is energetically favored.
While both points of view described by Castin and Dalibard under (2) are
capable of accounting for details of interference observed in certain idealized
experiments, this does not show that these points of view are fully physically
equivalent.
4 The Appearance of PhaseWithout Symmetry-
Breaking
In 2005 Laloë(7) began to develop an elegant framework for analyzing the emer-
gence of phase in systems of BECs. One important application is to a system
of two BECs, each composed of non-interacting bosons, and each initially rep-
resented by a Fock state corresponding to a denite number of particles. This
provides a simplied and idealized model for the kind of experimental situation
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realized by Andrews et. al.(2) that rst demonstrated interference between two
BECs. An extension of that model is to measurements on BECs in di¤erent
internal states most simply, each in one of two di¤erent one-particle z -spin
states. This enables one to consider the BECs to be initially separate systems
no matter what their spatial overlap: and it naturally suggests the possibility
of a variety of di¤erent kinds of measurement capable of revealing interference
between them of spin-component in any direction in the x-y plane. Such mea-
surements are considered in Mullin, Krotkov and Laloë(8), Laloë(12), and Laloë
and Mullin(10): here I follow Laloës(12) presentation.
Consider a pair of noninteracting BECs with two internal states that may
be taken to be eigenstates of z -spin with eigenvalues +~=2 and  ~=2 in the
normalized Fock state7
ji = 1p
Na!Nb!
a^yNaua;a^yNbvb; j0i (3)
representing Na particles with internal (z-spin) state  and spatial state ua and
Nb particles with orthogonal internal (z-spin) state  and spatial state vb, where
j0i is the vacuum state.
If 	^(r) is the eld operator for z-spin , 	^(r) for z-spin , and y indicates
the adjoint operation, then the number density operator of the BECs is
n^(r) = 	^y(r)	^(r) + 	^
y
(r)	^(r) (4)
and the density operator for their spin component in a direction in the x   y
plane at an angle ' from the x-axis is
^'(r) = e
 i'	^y(r)	^(r) + e
+i'	^y(r)	^(r) (5)
Suppose that one measurement is made of the '-component of particle spin in
a small region of space r centered around point r. The corresponding spin
operator is
S^(r; ') =
Z
r
d3r0^'(r0) (6)
For su¢ ciently small r, this has only three eigenvalues  = 0;1 since no
more than one particle would be found in r. The single-particle eigenstates
for nding a particle there with  = 1 are
jr; i = jri 
 1p
2
h
e i'=2 ji+ e+i'=2 ji
i
(7)
where jri is a single-particle spatial state whose wave-function equals 1 inside
r but 0 everywhere outside r. The corresponding N -particle projector is
P^=1(r;') =
1
2
Z
r
d3r0 [n^(r0) + ^'(r0)] (8)
7Note that atoms forming a BEC need not have integral spin: their statistics depend on
details of their nuclear as well as electronic states (see e.g. Leggett(21)).
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and the projector for nding no particle there is
P^=0(r) =

1 
Z
r
d3r0n^(r0)

(9)
As r ! 0, the corresponding eigenstates (for variable r) form a quasi-complete
basis for the N -particle space.
Now consider a sequence of m measurements of transverse spin-components
'j in very small non-overlapping regionsrj , each of volume, centered around
points rj (1  j  m). Since the projectors for non-overlapping regions com-
mute, the joint probability for detecting m particles with spins j in regions
rj is D

P^1(r1;'1) P^2(r2;'2) ::: P^m(rm;'m)E (10)
Using (8) together with (4) and (5) this gives a product of several terms, each
containing various products of eld operators. Since these commute, we can
push all the creation operators to the left and all the annihilation operators to
the right. Expanding the eld operators in terms of a basis jua; i, jvb; i of
single particle states
	^(r) = ua(r) a^ua; + ::: ; 	^(r) = vb(r) a^vb; + ::: (11)
But none of the "dotted" terms will contribute to (10), since ji contains no
particles in states other than jua; i, jvb; i.
Each term now contains between hj and ji a string of creation operators
followed by a string of annihilation operators. If a state jua; i or jvb; i does
not appear exactly the same number of times in each of these, it will not con-
tribute to (10): if it does appear exactly the same number of times in each of
these, every creation or annihilation operator will introduce a factor
p
Na;b   q
where q depends on the term but q < m. If m  Na; Nb, these factors can
be approximated by
p
Na;b respectively. So now each eld operator has been
replaced in (10) by a factor
p
Na;b multiplying a position wave-function ua or vb
(or its complex conjugate). But we still have to take account of particle number
conservation in each sequence. This can be done by a clever trick, using the
mathematical identity
2Z
0
d
2
ein = n;0 (12)
By multiplying each 	^(r) (or rather
p
Naua(r)) by ei, and each 	^y(r) (or
rather
p
Nau

a(r)) by e
 i, and integrating  over 2 (and similarly for the b
particles), we automatically take account of particle number conservation!
Since  is very small, the spatial wave-functions are each approximately
constant over each region rj .The joint probability for detection of m particles
with spins j in regions rj (1 < j < m), each of volume , is then
m
Na!Nb!
2Z
0
d
2
mY
j=1

Na jua(rj)j2 +Nb jvb(rj)j2+
j
p
NaNb
 
ei( 'j)ua(rj)vb (rj) + c:c
  (13)
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or, with (r) = arg [ua(r)=vb(r)],
m
Na!Nb!
2Z
0
d
2
mY
j=1

Na jua(rj)j2 +Nb jvb(rj)j2+
2j
p
NaNb jua(rj)j jvb(rj)j cos( + (rj)  'j)

(14)
Since we are interested in comparing relative probabilities of detection, the
prexed normalization terms can now be dropped.
First consider the case m = 1: measurement of '-spin on a single particle. If
 were xed, these relative detection probabilities would be just what one would
expect from a state with a denite relative phase between the two condensates,
namely the (unnormalized) phase state
ji =
h
N
1
2
a a^yua;e i=2 +N
1
2
b a^yvb;ei=2
iNa+Nb j0i (15)
with one-particle pure spin-state density matrix W proportional to
Na jua(r1)j2
p
NaNbe
 iua(r1)vb(r1)p
NaNbe
iua(r1)v

b (r1) Nb jvb(r1)j2

(16)
Moreover, the expectation value of z-spin in stateW is proportional toNa jua(r1)j2 
Nb jvb(r1)j2, also just what one would expect if ji represented the denite, pre-
existing relative phase between the condensates. But the uniform integral over
 "washes out" the appearance of any denite phase relation between the two
condensates, so the overall probability distribution for measurement of '-spin
on a single particle corresponds to no interference.
Now consider the case m = 2: joint measurement of '1-spin and '2-spin
with results 1; 2 respectively on two particles. The -probability distribution
for result 2 conditional on outcome 1 is now weighted by a factor that depends
both on the angle '1 of the measurement on particle 1 and on its outcome and
location (1; r1) and is proportional to
Na jua(r1)j2+Nb jvb(r1)j2+21
p
NaNb jua(r1)j jvb(r1)j cos(+(r1) '1) (17)
This may well already give rise to a slight correlation between the results 1; 2:
if 1 is +1 and '1 and '2 are close, then 2 is more likely than not also to equal
+1. But as one considers additional transverse spin measurements, strong corre-
lations become apparent. The probability distribution for the transverse spin of
the (m+ 1)st particle conditional on outcomes j for the other m measurements
becomes strongly peaked as m increases. Laloë(12) comments
When more and more spin measurements are obtained, the -distribution
becomes narrower and narrower....Standard quantummechanics con-
siders that  has no physical existence at the beginning of the series
of measurements, and that its determination is just the result of
a series of random perturbations of the system introduced by the
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measurements. Nevertheless (14) shows that all observations are to-
tally compatible with the idea of a pre-existing value of  which is
perfectly well dened but unknown, remains constant, and is only
revealed (instead of created) by the measurements. (p. 43)
It is tempting to think of the emergence of a denite phase here as a stochas-
tic, dynamical process in which each subsequent transverse spin-measurement
(with increasing probability) renders the relative phase of the two condensates
more denite. But the parameter  enters the above quantum mechanical
analysis only as a convenient mathematical device for calculating conditional
probabilities, and not (as in (15)) as a way of characterizing the state of the
condensates themselves. Moreover, the analysis nowhere appealed to the evo-
lution of the state of the condensates, whether unitary (in accordance with the
Schrödinger equation) or non-unitary (in accordance with von Neumanns pro-
jection postulate). But if one were instead to assume a temporal sequence of
projective 'j-spin measurements, then (neglecting Schrödinger evolution) the
state of the remaining condensate would progressively come to approximate a
state of denite phase.
5 A Strengthened EPR argument?
Laloë(12) goes on to consider alternative spatial wave-functions ua; vb for the
two condensates. He takes one such conguration to justify this claim in the
abstract to his paper.
We study in this article how the EPR argument can be transposed to
this case, and show that the argument becomes stronger, mostly be-
cause the measured systems themselves are now macroscopic. (p.35)
He makes the simplifying assumption that ua; vb have the same phase at
each point r (though their amplitudes may di¤er) so  = 0. He then considers
an arrangement in which ua; vb overlap only in two distant regions A;B and
m successful transverse spin-measurements are considered in non-overlapping
small regions of A. The foregoing analysis shows that, for m  100, the condi-
tional probabilities for the outcomes of additional transverse spin-measurements
in small non-overlapping regions of B will di¤er little from corresponding un-
conditional probabilities for a phase state with some denite  (whose value
depends on the outcomes of the m measurements in A). In particular, if B con-
tains a macroscopic number of particles there will be some angle ' such that
each of, say, 1023 successful individual measurements of '-spin on particles in
B is almost certain to give outcome  = +1, conditional on the outcomes of
the m measurements in A. Laloë(12) comments
Here we have a curious case where it is the measured system itself
that spontaneously creates a pointer made of a macroscopic number
of parallel spins. Moreover, for condensates that are extended in
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space, ...this process can create instantaneously parallel pointers in
remote regions of space, a situation obviously reminiscent of the
EPR argument in its spin version given by Bohm. (p.37)
Recall Bohms spin version of the EPR Gedankenexperiment, featuring two
spin 12 particles in the spin singlet state
j si = 1p
2
[j"#i   j#"i] (18)
where " (#) labels a z-spin eigenvector with positive (negative) eigenvalue and
the order of the arrows in each component of the superposition corresponds to
that of the particlesstate spaces. Transposed to this situation, the intended
conclusion of the EPR argument is that quantum mechanical description is
incomplete since the state j si does not describe certain "elements of reality"
associated with each of these two particles: for each direction, one such "element
of reality" corresponds to the (eigen)value of spin-component in that direction
which a well-conducted measurement of that spin component would reveal, were
one to be carried out.
After removing the excess erudition of which Einstein complained right after
its publication, the original EPR argument went like this8 . Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen(29) assumed the following su¢ cient criterion for reality
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with cer-
tainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality correspond-
ing to this quantity. (p.777)
Suppose one were to get outcome  in a measurement of the (arbitrary)
'-component of spin on particle a of a Bohm-EPR pair in spin state j si at a
time when their spatial state corresponds to a; b being far apart (with negligible
probability of nding a outside A or b outside B, where A;B are widely sepa-
rated spatial regions). Assuming this is a projective measurement, the resulting
state is
j 0i = j'' i (19)
Applying the Born rule to j 0i one could predict with probability unity that
a (well-conducted) measurement of the value of the '-component of spin on
particle b would yield outcome  . EPR further take state j 0i to describe
b as certainly (with probability unity) having value   for its '-component
of spin even if no measurement is performed on b. Assuming (locality) that
such a hypothetical measurement on a alone would not disturb b, they infer
that in the hypothetical situation in which (only) a is measured with result ,
the '-component of spin of b would be  , prior to and independent of the
8 In a letter to Schrödinger of June 19th, 1935 Einstein said that the main point was, so
to speak, overwhelmed by erudition ("die Hauptsache ist, sozusagen, durch Gelehrsamkeit
verschüttet").
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measurement on a: similarly, in the hypothetical situation in which (only) a is
measured with result  , the '-component of spin of b would be , prior to
and independent of the measurement on a. Hence in any hypothetical situa-
tion in which (only) a is measured, b would have had a denite (though as yet
unknown) '-component of spin, prior to and independent of the measurement
on a. It follows that b always has a denite (though unknown) '-component
of spin in the spin singlet state, irrespective of what measurement (if any) one
contemplates performing on a or b: by symmetric reasoning, so too does a. To-
gether with EPRs necessary condition for completeness ("every element of the
physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory") this establishes
the incompleteness of quantum mechanical description.9
Laloë(12) takes his BEC Gedankenexperiment to strengthen the EPR argu-
ment "mostly because the measured systems themselves are now macroscopic".
In evaluating this claim later, it will be helpful to bear in mind what is in some
ways a more straightforward extension of the Bohm-EPR scenario to the macro-
scopic scale, even though the resulting Gedankenexperiment is so far beyond the
bounds of practicality as to challenge credulity (cf. Schrödingers own reference
to his infamous cat scenario as "ridiculous")10 . So consider a pair of spatially
separated macroscopic systems a; b, composed of N  1023 spin 12 particles each,
in an entangled spin state j Maci of total z-component of angular momentum
zero
j Maci = 1p
2
[j(N ") (N #)i   j(N #) (N ")i] (20)
Applied to this scenario, an argument parallel to that in the previous paragraph
would lead one to conclude that in j Maci each of a; b has a denite macroscopic
z-spin that quantum mechanics fails to describe. To reach this conclusion, the
argument would consider a hypothetical measurement of the z-spin on a (a
macroscopic object) and its outcome (a macroscopic value for the z-spin on a) to
conclude independent of any measurements that b has a denite macroscopic
value of z-spin in state j Maci. Note that since this argument need not involve
consideration of measurements of any other (incompatible) spin-component on
a, it is irrelevant that j si, unlike j Maci, takes the same form whatever spin-
component one chooses to dene eigenstates in terms of which to express the
superposed total state in question.
However elegant the argument, EPRs conclusion is now generally taken to
be mistaken, primarily because of Bells work and the subsequent experimental
violation of his eponymous inequalities. Now if EPRs argument is valid but not
sound, which of their assumptions are false? Even after Bohrs prompt refuta-
9Note that this stripped-down version of the EPR argument nowhere appeals to the pos-
sibility of alternative measurements on a that would warrant attributions of values to incom-
patible observables on b. Einstein himself gives a version of the argument in his letter to
Schrödinger dated June 19, 1935. In that letter he makes it clear that the argument doesnt
depend on this possibility by saying that the treatment of an incompatible pair of observables
"ist mir Wurst" (I couldnt care less about it)!
10Schrödinger called Gedankenexperimenten like that of his eponymous cat "burleske Fälle".
By contrast the Bohm-EPR Gedankenexperiment famously leant itself to implementation as
an actual experiment with profound results for quantum nonlocality.
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tion and extensive more recent discussions of quantum nonlocality, I believe
there is still no consensus on exactly how to answer that question. But I think
many would follow Gisin(30) in pinning the blame on EPRs locality assump-
tions, taking the failure of quantum mechanics to satisfy all these assumptions to
show why some of its (veried) predictions violate Bell inequalities derived from
them. More specically, the condition Shimony(31) called Outcome Indepen-
dence fails for quantum mechanics, as illustrated by the fact that the quantum
mechanical probability for outcome  of a measurement of '-spin on a in the
Bohm EPR scenario conditional on a measurement of '0-spin on b depends on
the outcome 0 of the latter measurement (though it does not depend on which
'0-spin-component (if any) is measured on b if the outcome of any such mea-
surement is ignored). This failure of Outcome Independence does not facilitate
signalling between spacelike separated locations, and a variety of proofs have
been o¤ered that quantum mechanical nonlocality is innocuous because it does
not permit such superluminal signalling.
But, as Maudlin(32) (among many others) pointed out, there is still a prob-
lem reconciling quantum mechanical nonlocality with relativity. Recall that,
according to the EPR argument, a measurement on a projects j si onto the
state j 0i in which the '-spin of b is denite. EPR took this to be a straightfor-
ward application of quantum mechanics itself, unlike their reality criterion and
locality assumptions which were motivated by more general physical consider-
ations. If quantum mechanical description is complete, in conict with EPRs
conclusion, then the '-spin of b was not denite prior to the measurement on
a. But if the a; b measurements are spacelike separated events, then they have
no invariant temporal order, and any attempt to specify the spacetime location
at which the '-spin of b becomes denite must appeal to structure not provided
by a relativistic space-time and hard to reconcile with it.
Despite this problem, Laloë(12) takes the analysis of his BEC Gedankenex-
periment to predict that spin-component measurements on a few microscopic
particles in A will immediately create a spontaneous transverse polarization of
a macroscopic assembly of spins in B.
what standard quantum mechanics describes here is not something
that propagates along the state and has a physical mechanism... it
is just something with no time durationthat is a mere consequence
of the postulate of quantum measurement (wave packet reduction).
(p.45)
In fact the analysis he has given here does not yet establish the claim that,
following these measurements in A, a single measurement of the total '-spin in
B would (almost) certainly yield the predicted, denite macroscopic outcome.
For that analysis concerns only multiple (successful) microscopic measurements
of '-spin on individual particles in specic tiny regions of B. But it is true that
successfully measuring the '-spin of each of a macroscopic number of particles
within B and adding the results would be one way of measuring (a signicant
portion of) the total '-spin in B, and I see no reason to doubt that an extension
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of Laloës(12) analysis would predict a macroscopic outcome for the result of a
single measurement of the total '-spin in B.
How does the EPR argument apply to Laloës(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment,
in which the a; b condensates overlap only in remote regions A;B, a fewm  100
successful transverse spin-component measurements are performed in A, and a
macroscopic number of particles is present in B? Here is what he says
We have a situation that is similar to the usual EPR situation: mea-
surements performed in A can determine the direction of spins in
both regions A and B. If we rephrase the EPR argument to adapt
it to this case, we just have to replace the words before the mea-
surement in Aby before the series of measurements in A, but all
the rest of the reasoning remains exactly the same: since the el-
ements of reality in B cannot appear under the e¤ect of what is
done at an arbitrary distance in region A, these elements of reality
must exist even before the measurements performed in A. Since the
double Fock state (3) of quantum mechanics does not contain any
information on the direction of spins in B, this theory is incomplete.
(p.46)
There is one clear disanalogy between the Bohm-EPR scenario and Laloës(12)
BEC Gedankenexperiment. Even if an individual spin-component measurement
is projective, the sequence of measurements performed in A does not collapse
the state (3) into an eigenstate of total '-spin in B: at most it produces a
state of the BECs for which a measurement of total '-spin in B is very likely
to give a particular result. Hence the EPR reality criterion cannot be applied
as stated, since it species probability unity. This disanalogy does not appear
for the macroscopic Bohm-EPR state j Maci, which is in this respect a better
generalization of the original Bohm-EPR state j si to a system of a macroscopic
number of atomic components. Does this disanalogy matter? I think it does.
Since they are arguing that quantum mechanical description is incomplete,
EPR need to have in mind a clear rival view of what it would be for it to be
complete. Quantum mechanics represents the (pure) state of systems by a wave-
function or state vector: how could such a mathematical object be considered to
o¤er a complete description of a systems properties? A natural answer is that
given by the so-called eigenvalue-eigenstate link: observable O represented by
self-adjoint operator O^ has value oi on a system if and only if the state of that
system can be represented by pure state j!ii where O^ j!ii = oi j!ii. Indeed,
EPR apply this link in both directions in section 1 of their paper. To adapt
EPRs reasoning to Laloës(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment one would have to
modify it to avoid relying on the eigenvalue-eigenstate link.
Einsteins own preferred variant on EPR11 does not rely on the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link. Instead it directly argues for incompleteness of description by
the wave-function. As applied to the Bohm-EPR scenario Einstein(34) would
reason that while a measurement of z-spin on a would collapse bs state onto
11For which, see Einstein ((33), pp. 340-2; (34), pp. 320-24; (35), pp. 82-87).
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an eigenstate of z-spin, a measurement of x-spin on a would collapse the state
of b onto an eigenstate of x-spin. By locality ("Grundsatz II" of Einstein(34)),
neither measurement could inuence the real state of b, which would therefore be
the same no matter what measurement (if any) were performed on a. But there
is no way to understand both an x-spin eigenstate and a z-spin eigenstate as
o¤ering a complete description of the same real state of b, since these eigenstates
imply radically di¤erent statistical predictions for the results of measurements
on b.
Einsteins preferred mode of reasoning cannot be applied directly to Laloës(12)
BEC Gedankenexperiment. For even if the m transverse spin measurements on
particles in A are projective, they do not project the quantum state onto a pure
state that has the form of a tensor product, one factor of which has support
conned to B and so could be taken to describe just the contents of B.
Both the reasoning of the above stripped-down version of the EPR argument
and that of Einsteins preferred variant may, however, be applied to the macro-
scopic generalization of Bohm-EPR represented by the state j Maci, provided
only that one takes the conclusion to be the incompleteness of the description
o¤ered by j Maci of the real state of b in that scenario.12 On the other hand,
Laloës(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment has the distinct advantage of not being
totally beyond the bounds of practicality. As he says, progress in experimental
studies of dilute gas BECs may bring us within reach of producing systems of
condensates for whose quantum mechanical modeling the double Fock state pro-
vides a reasonable idealization, and whose temporal evolution does not render
an analysis in terms of multiple simultaneous measurements wholly irrelevant.
Just as the Bohm-EPR scenario is no longer merely a Gedankenexperiment, we
may be on the verge of realizing variants of Laloës(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment
as real experiments.
6 What Bohr would (or should?) have said
Laloë(12) presents his Gedankenexperiment as a challenge to Bohrs(36) refuta-
tion of the EPR argument in these words:
What is new here is that the EPR elements of reality in B corre-
spond to a system that is macroscopic. One can no longer invoke its
microscopic character to deprive the system contained in B of any
physical reality! The system can even be at our scale, correspond to
a macroscopic magnetization that can be directly observable with a
hand compass; is it then still possible to state that it has no intrin-
sic physical reality? When the EPR argument is transposed to the
macroscopic world, it is clear that Bohrs refutation does not apply
12The qualication is important in the case of Einsteins preferred variant. For while a
measurement of, say, the x-component of spin on a would lead to a di¤erent eigenstate for
b, there is no reason to expect this to correspond to a macroscopic eigenvalue for any spin-
component.
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in the form written in his article; it has to be at least modied in
some way. (pp. 46-7)
On the contrary, I venture that Bohrs reasoning in his refutation of EPR
applies equally well to Laloës(12) Gedankenexperiment. I say "venture" rather
than "claim" since any analysis based on an interpretation of just what Bohr
meant in his refutation must remain tentative. What follows may, with some
justication, be considered an attempt to put words into Bohrs mouth that he
would never have let pass his lips!
In his refutation, Bohr(36) charged their reality criterion with fatal ambiguity.
The key passage is notoriously obscure, so I quote it at length.
Of course there is in a case like that considered no question of
a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation during
the last critical stage of the measuring procedure. But even at this
stage there is essentially the question of an inuence on the very
conditions which dene the possible types of predictions regarding
the future behavior of the system. Since these conditions consti-
tute an inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to
which the term physical realitycan properly be attached, we see
that the argumentation of the mentioned authors does not justify
their conclusion that quantum-mechanical description is essentially
incomplete. (p.700)
Note that Bohr here appears to deny that the aw in the argument is the
falsity of EPRs locality assumptions, while pointing to a di¤erent, and perhaps
deeper, problem with their assumptions about physical reality. The problem
is deeper in so far as the falsity of these assumptions would undermine the
applicability of notions of locality that rest on them. Note also that in the
quoted passage Bohr does not mention any division between microscopic and
macroscopic systems. Why, then would Laloë suppose that his refutation is
based on the denial of any physical reality for microscopic systems that would
not apply equally to macroscopic systems?
The key phrase is surely that which Bohr himself stresses, namely "the very
conditions which dene the possible types of predictions regarding the future be-
havior of the system". What does Bohr think those conditions are? I believe a
close reading of the rest of his reply to EPR shows that what he has in mind
here are the experimental conditions set up by an experimenter who wishes to
perform the measurement in question. Moreover, this reading receives support
from others of Bohrs writings. Bohr would insist that any consideration even
of a hypothetical measurement must be based on some specication of the ex-
perimental conditions in order to be well-grounded enough to play a role in an
argument like that of EPR. His idea is that since any ascription of physical real-
ity to a quantity is meaningful only in a well-dened experimental context, the
element of reality EPR argue for cannot be detached from the (hypothetical)
experimental context in which it is initially inferred to play an independent role
in the argument, including its conclusion.
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Bohr maintained that the experimental conditions must be specied in or-
dinary language, suitably enriched with the vocabulary of classical physics. In
his words (Bohr(37) )
it is decisive to recognize that however far the phenomena tran-
scend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all
evidence must be expressed in classical terms. The argument is sim-
ply that by the word experimentwe refer to a situation where we
can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and
that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and of
the results of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous
language with suitable application of the terminology of classical
physics. (p.209)
The main point here is the distinction between the objects under
investigation and the measuring instruments which serve to dene,
in classical terms, the conditions under which the phenomena ap-
pear. (pp. 221-2)
It has often been assumed that the distinction to which Bohr refers here is
one based on size: that the apparatus is macroscopic, and so accurately treatable
by classical physics, while the object under investigation is microscopic, and so
must be treated quantum mechanically. That this assumption is false becomes
apparent when one reads the discussion in Bohr(37) of his debates with Einstein,
in which he applies quantum mechanics to macroscopic objects without even
feeling the need to comment on the fact.
The distinction Bohr has in mind is a pragmatic one: in order to apply
quantum mechanics to a system at all, he believes, one must describe the whole
experimental arrangement surrounding that system classically. That is true
whether the system under investigation is microscopic or macroscopic. But
any object that one (perforce) described classically when it gured in the exper-
imental arrangement for investigating some other system may itself be made the
system under investigation in the context of a di¤erent experimental arrange-
ment, in which case it would be legitimate to apply quantum mechanics to it
in that context, and even necessary if classical physics proved inadequate to
predict results of observing it in that context.
Bohrs response to EPR did not rest on the denial of physical reality to iso-
lated microscopic systems. Instead, it rested on the denial of context-independent
attributions of properties (or rather physical quantities) to systems of any size.
He took this denial to be required by the transition to quantum physics from
classical physics. As he put it,
The necessity of discriminating in each experimental arrangement
between those parts of the physical system considered which are to
be treated as measuring instruments and those which constitute the
objects under investigation may indeed be said to form a principal
distinction between classical and quantum-mechanical descriptions
of physical phenomena. ((36), p.701)
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On my reading, this passage makes clear just how radical Bohrs view of
quantum mechanical description was. In his view, with quantum mechanics,
all ascriptions of physical reality to properties of systems become contextual:
taken out of context, they lack signicance. This denial of signicance rests
on a pragmatist rather than a vericationist view of meaning13 . To supply the
context needed to render meaningful the ascription of a property to a system
that one has decided to treat as "an object under investigation" when applying
quantum mechanics, one must describe other surrounding systems classically.
This does not mean that those other systems are classical rather than quantum
mechanical. Still less does it mean that there is a special class of systems ("the
macroscopic systems") which must be described classically. But it does mean
that there can be no purely quantum mechanical description of the world, or
even of any part of the world to which one contemplates applying quantum me-
chanics. Laloës(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment helps to bring out this radical
character of Bohrs view even though it does not challenge it. On Bohrs view,
once one has decided to apply quantum mechanics to the system of BECs in
this Gedankenexperiment, even the ascription of a macroscopic magnetization
to part of that system in a region lacks signicance, absent classically described
conditions external to the system. It may be hard to accept, but it is no refuta-
tion of this view, that bringing up a hand compass renders that ascription not
only meaningful but true.
This response to Laloës(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment has interesting im-
plications for the claim that classical physics (or parts of it, including classical
mechanics) is reducible to quantum physics (including quantum mechanics). If
one endorses the response, then one has strong grounds for denying such claims
of reducibility. According to classical physics, the behavior of a hand compass
near region B containing enough of the BEC system following 100 or so mea-
surements of transverse spin on particles in region A would warrant ascribing
a macroscopic magnetization to (the contents of) that region. Any reduction
of classical physics to quantum physics here would involve showing that this is
true14 . But if one endorses (what I take to be) Bohrs response, this is not true,
or even signicant, outside of an appropriate context. So the most one could
expect is a contextual reduction of classical to quantum physics. But even this
would elude one in so far as at some stage the assumed context could not be
described within a signicant application of quantum physics15 .
13Here an analogy may be helpful. Consider the following message carved on a tree-trunk
deep in a forest: "Ill meet you here tomorrow". This message is signicant only in a context
which species to whom I and you refer and on what day the message was carved. Ab-
sent such a context, the message is useless and so lacks pragmatic signicance even though
its semantic role in English is perfectly clear. Supplying the context renders the message
veriable.
14One might qualify this with approximately, but the qualitative nature of the ascription
renders this irrelevant.
15This train of thought may be what Landau and Lifshitz(38) had in mind when they said
"quantum mechanics occupies a very unusual place within physical theories: it
contains classical mechanics as a limiting case, yet at the same time it requires
this limiting case for its own formulation." p.3
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7 Emergent Properties and Emergent Objects
Laloë summarizes the essence of his (12) as follows
in some quantum situations where macroscopic systems populate
Fock states with well dened populations, the EPR argument be-
comes signicantly stronger than in the historical example with two
microscopic particles. The argument speaks eloquently in favour of
a pre-existing relative phase of the two states ... but certainly not in
favour of the orthodox point of view where the phase appears during
the measurements. (p.51)
In spite of the objections I have lodged against his argument, Laloë here
expresses an important insight that should not be lost if we wish to understand
the emergence of relative phase between BECs. The EPR argument was di-
rected against a popular version of the Copenhagen interpretation that takes
the quantum state to describe intrinsic properties of a system it represents, and
measurement to project the quantum state onto a new one that describes the
systems new intrinsic properties. If one tries to understand the emergence of
relative phase between BECs initially in a double Fock state as a stochastic dy-
namical process mediated by successive projective measurements on individual
particles in the condensate, then, as Laloë goes on to say, surprising non-local
e¤ects appear in the macroscopic world (which, I might add, are extremely dif-
cult to reconcile with relativistic spacetime structure, even though they do not
admit superluminal signalling).
Must one who rejects this popular version of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion conclude that the relative phase between BECs was denite already prior
to measurements on its constituent particles, which simply progressively reveal
that pre-existing phase ? Drawing this conclusion on the basis of EPR-type
reasoning, one would take  to be an additional variable characterizing the
BECs in quantum state (3), initially hidden but gradually revealed by trans-
verse spin measurements. But further investigations by Laloë and Mullin(10)
e¤ectively block this route. They derive (Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt)-
type inequalities for carefully chosen observables of particles in quantum state
(3) on the assumption of a pre-existing relative phase between the condensates,
and show that quantum mechanics predicts their violation in that state.16 So,
just as in the Bohm-EPR case, the intended conclusion of EPR-type reasoning
here proves to be incompatible with quantum mechanics itself.
There is a di¤erent way to use a pre-existing relative phase  to account for
the interference exhibited by a system of two similar condensates as a result of
transverse spin measurements. It is to deny that their initial quantum state is
correctly represented by (3), and to claim that it is rather a phase state (15).
The analysis of section 4 shows that these two quantum states lead to identical
16 It is, however, noteworthy that experimental violation would be extraordinarily di¢ cult
to arrange because it would be essential to perform measurements on all the particles in the
system of condensates.
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interference patterns for the phenomena considered there. Of course, by taking
this line one is evading rather than solving the problem of understanding how
a relative phase emerges in the double Fock state (3). Such evasion could be
justied by an argument as to why any natural preparation procedure for a
system of condensates of the type we have been considering would give rise to
the phase state (15) instead. But if one recalls that the whole discussion of
interference between similar BECs was provoked by experiments like those of
Andrews et. al.(2), the prospects of developing such an argument seem bleak.
Leggett(21), for example, says this
The authors start with a trap which is split into two by a laser-
induced barrier so high that the single-atom tunnelling time between
the two wells is greater than the age of the universe. They then
condense clouds of 87Rb atoms independently in the two wells and
allow them to come to thermal equilibrium. At this point there
seems no doubt that the correct quantum mechanical wave-function
of the system is, schematically, [of the form of a double Fock state]
(p.138)
He goes on to show that the time-evolution of each component to bring them
into overlap after removal of the laser barrier will not make this double Fock state
approach a phase state. Laloë(12) notes that phase states can form a "preferred
basis" for the system coupling to its environmenent. In this case, environmental
decoherence will tend to convert a double Fock state (a superposition of phase
states) into a corresponding improper mixture of phase states. But as he says,
this does not really a¤ect his analysis based on attributing a double Fock state
to the BEC system. It would be a mistake to take this improper mixture to
represent some denite but unknown pure phase state.
It is interesting to contrast the case of a system of dilute gas BECs in a double
Fock state (3) with other systems involving a pair of condensates that exhibit
interference phenomena accounted for by appeal to a relative phase between
them. When a pair of conductors separated by a thin metal oxide junction is
cooled to become superconducting, a current ows across the junction even in
the absence of an applied voltage. This DC Josephson e¤ect may be explained
quantum mechanically by appeal to a well-dened phase di¤erence  across
the junction in the wave-function representing the state of the system: the DC
current is proportional to sin. Leggett and Sols(25) write the wave-function as
follows,
 

jaj ei=2 L + jbj e i=2 R
N
(21)
where the system consists of N "bosons" (Cooper pairs) and  L ( R) is the
Schrödinger amplitude for a boson to be on the left (right) of the junction.
Note the analogy with the phase state (15)17 . If positing a phase state like (21)
17Leggett and Sols (1991) actually apply their analysis to a generic Josephson e¤ect in a
Bose superuid, of which a superconductor is one example, another being superuid Helium.
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is indeed the only way to explain the Josephson e¤ect, then just as in the case
of the dilute gas BECs, one should ask how a relative phase has emerged. One
possible answer is that there is always some relative phase di¤erence between
any pair of similar superconductors (even those prepared independently and
arbitrarily far away from each other), and its (random) value emerges as a result
of spontaneous breaking of the U(1) symmetry. Leggett and Sols(25) reject this
answer, and Leggett(26) advances an interesting argument for doing so.
To set the context for this argument, note that the state (21) may be ex-
panded in a basis of double Fock states jNa; Nbi as
 
+N=2X
M= N=2
jCM j eiM jNa; Nbi (22)
where N = (Na +Nb), M = 1=2(Na  Nb) and
jNa; Nbi  a^yNa L a^yNb R j0i (23)
It follows that in state (21) the di¤erence between the number of bosons in
the left-hand condensate and the number in the right-hand condensate is in-
determinate, even though together they contain exactly N bosons. This may
be acceptable in the typical situation in which one takes (21) to represent the
state of a pair of similar condensates, prepared together and spatially separated
only by a thin junction. But it is harder to stomach if the left and right hand
condensates have been separately prepared in di¤erent continents!
Leggett(26) rejects this outré suggestion, and presents a thought experiment
as a reason for doing so.
The "experiment" simply consists in weighing them at separate
times ... that can be arbitrarily far separated, so as to determine
the number di¤erence [Na  Nb] at these times, without ever making
Josephson contact between them. (p.459)
If their total state each time they are weighed takes the form (21), then
there is no reason to expect the results to agree: indeed, one would expect them
to di¤er by an amount of the order of N
1
2 . If, on the other hand, the correct
representation is a double Fock state like (23) (or proper mixture of these),
then the results would be expected to agree (within the margin of error of the
experiment). Leggett(26) concludes
I can see no reason whatever to doubt that it is this latter conclusion
which would be found experimentally, so that in this (operationally
dened) sense, the statement that "two superuids which have never
seen one another before nevertheless have a denite relative phase"
is, I believe, false. (ibid.)
None of the phenomena considered in this paper provide any reason to doubt
Leggetts conclusion. In particular, if one takes spontaneous symmetry break-
ing to be a necessary condition for emergence, then there is no reason to count
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interference between separately prepared dilute gas BECs as an emergent phe-
nomenon. But suppose we take the possibility of spontaneous symmetry break-
ing absolutely seriously here and consider what we should say if the results of
Leggetts thought experiment were to confound his rm expectations. In that
case, I submit, we should have evidence for more than just the emergence of
relative phase in certain condensates consequent upon spontaneous symmetry
breaking: we should have reason to accept the spontaneous emergence of com-
posite objects the condensates themselves.
Here we have at least a conceptual possibility not (to my knowledge) con-
templated by philosophers interested in emergence. When philosophers have
considered the possibility of emergent objects, they have had in mind a case in
which an object composed of a perfectly determinate set of microscopic parts
possesses an emergent property (however that notion is analyzed).18 But what
we are presently contemplating is a case in which each of two objects, composed
of nothing but microscopic parts of a certain kind, contains no denite number
of these objects, although together the pair is composed of a denite number of
these constituent parts.
At rst this may seem analogous to more familiar cases: consider a cats tail
and the rest of its body, Siamese twins, two colliding galaxies, or the stratosphere
and troposphere. But in such cases the parts of the total system are spatially
contiguous and the indeterminateness of composition of each where they join is
naturally attributed to the vagueness of the language we use to describe them.
If two similar condensates, independently prepared on di¤erent continents, had
a denite relative phase, then each condensate would be an emergent object
in a much stronger sense. The indeterminateness of composition could not be
localized to any spatially intermediate region and would be distributed equally
among all their component bosons. Perhaps we should have here a new candi-
date for the metaphysicians disputed category of vague objects?
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